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Abstract 
 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to identify the party most preferred to take the risks 
associated with the Target Cost Contracts and Guaranteed Maximum Price Contracts 
(TCC/GMP) in the Hong Kong context. 
Design/methodology/approach – An empirical questionnaire survey was conducted with the 
relevant industrial practitioners to solicit their preferences of risk allocation in TCC/GMP 
construction projects in Hong Kong. 
Findings – The survey findings indicated that risks on tender documentation and project 
design are better borne by clients, while construction related risks are perceived to be taken 
by contractors. The research findings are consistent with other similar studies on risk 
allocation in construction projects in general. 
Practical implications – This paper has developed a preferred risk allocation scheme for the 
delivery of future TCC/GMP projects, taking Hong Kong as an example. It can serve as a 
useful guide for the decision makers to determine an optimal risk allocation at the planning 
stage of a TCC/GMP scheme. 
Originality/value – This study is expected to benefit both academic researchers and 
industrial practitioners in generating an equitable risk sharing mechanism for TCC/GMP 
projects. It has provided sufficient empirical evidence, added to the growing body of 
knowledge and laid a solid foundation for further research such as an international 
comparison of various risk allocation schemes associated with this kind of contractual 
arrangement. 
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Introduction 
 
The problems associated with the traditional procurement approach are well regarded as cost 
overrun and adversarial working relationship between employer and contractor, especially in 
case of competitive fixed-price lump-sum contracts (Lahdenpera, 2010). It is suggested by 
Lahdenpera (2010) that gain-share and pain-share depending on the success of the entire 
project make the employer and contractor consider each other’s views better and collaborate 
more efficiently. Ingirige and Sexton (2007) held similar notion that the objective of a target 
cost contract (TCC) is to motivate contracting parties to lower the cost incurred without 
affecting the quality or delivery to maximise the contractor’s profitability and client’s 
savings. 
Infrastructure developments (e.g. roads, railways, metros, bridges, utility services, etc) play a 
vital role in influencing the economic viability and social welfare of every country. The 
complexity and dynamics of the decision making in infrastructure development and 
management has steadily increased over recent years. Target cost contracts have been widely 
applied to deliver and manage critical modern infrastructure systems and buildings, with the 
purpose of enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of their service delivery. 
 
There has been an increasing trend of application of TCC and GMP (being a variant of TCC) 
contracts in the private sector and quasi-government sector in Hong Kong over recent years, 
especially in the sector of public infrastructure works and facilities services (Chan et al., 
2007a). Moreover, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(HKSAR) has introduced the New Engineering Contract Version 3 (NEC3) Option C (target 
cost with activity schedule) on a trial basis to an open nullah improvement works project in 
Sai Kung launched by the Drainage Services Department in August of 2009 (Cheung, 2008). 
TCC has been practised in the infrastructure sector projects of Hong Kong such as the Tseung 
Kwan O Railway Extension, Tung Chung Cable Car Project and Tsim Sha Tsui Metro 
Station Modification Works (Chan et al., 2007a; Chan et al., 2010a). The same procurement 
strategy was applied to the civil engineering works contracts of the South Island Railway 
Line in Hong Kong commenced in late 2010 (Mass Transit Railway Corporation, 2011). 
Interestingly, all these projects procured with TCC are civil engineering infrastructure works 
projects. 
 
Other research studies reported that GMP was applied in public school projects as well as 
municipal water and wastewater facilities in the United States (e.g. Rojas and Kell, 2008; 
Bogus et al., 2010). TCC was also adopted in mega-sized infrastructure works in the United 
Kingdom such as the New Terminal 5 of Heathrow Airport and some venues for the Olympic 
Games 2012 in London. Up to June of 2010, there have been 317 schemes of health services 
sector premises completed by the Department of Health of the United Kingdom as well under 
this procurement framework applying the New Engineering Contract Version 2 (NEC2) 
Option C (target cost with activity schedule) according to ProCure21 Guide (2010). 
 
However, not every TCC/GMP project is equally successful in terms of time, cost and quality 
performances due to the fact that the employers traditionally apply exculpatory clauses to 
minimise their own obligations in the contracts. This onerous allocation of risks may not be 
of interest to the construction industry in the long run. The short-term benefits of shifting as 
many risks as possible to contractors in the contracts may create an atmosphere of hostility 
that generates a considerable number of contractual disputes and, even worse, a reluctance to 
tender for works in future (Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003). 
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Despite the emerging trend of application of TCC/GMP schemes, there has been very scarce 
amount of published literature touching on the risk allocation of TCC/GMP projects in Hong 
Kong. As Wong (2006) stated, TCC was usually applied to projects with high risks. Thus, 
this paper aims to identify the key risk factors associated with TCC/GMP construction 
projects and then determine the party best capable to take such risks in the Hong Kong 
context. Such study is expected to benefit both academic researchers and industrial 
practitioners in exploring the preferred risk allocation of TCC/GMP projects, and in 
providing a strong base for further research such as an international comparison of different 
risk allocation schemes accompanied by this kind of contractual arrangement in infrastructure 
development projects traditionally inherent with high risks. 
 
Literature review 
 
Definitions of TCC and GMP 
 
A target cost contract (TCC) is described as a risk sharing contract (Scott, 1997). Boyd (1985) 
opined that TCC is a contract in which payment is based on the actual cost of contractor with 
incentives for efficient performance in terms of time and cost against the targets set before 
the contract is awarded. Broome and Perry (2002) suggested that a target cost is introduced in 
this kind of project and any cost saving or overrun against the target cost is divided with 
pre-agreed and specified portions. Wong (2006) stated that the employer paid the actual cost 
for the work completed to the contractor during the construction stage. When the final 
construction cost, termed as the final total cost differed from the initial contract target cost, 
the variance would be split between the employer and the contractor according to a 
pre-determined gain-share/pain-share ratio as stipulated in the contract. 
 
GMP can be considered as a lump sum price for a project in which the amount of money 
which the employer pays is the maximum price under the contract (Davis Langdon and Seah, 
2003). Both Fan and Greenwood (2004) and Davis Langdon and Seah (2003) advocated that 
GMP is not a form of contract, but it is a condition which can be applied to any form of 
contract. Masterman (2002) defined GMP as an agreement which will reward the contractor 
for any savings made against the GMP and penalise him when this sum is exceeded because 
of his own mismanagement or negligence. 
 
Rationale behind using TCC 
 
The development of a construction project can never be accurately predicted, and thus the 
contracts for construction projects are considered to be incomplete (Turner, 2004). The 
incompleteness of contracts is attributed to the reality of transaction cost, bounded rationality 
and information asymmetries which make the employer and contractor design a complete 
contract (Spier, 1992). Badenfelt (2010b) stated that extent of contract completeness is 
important in determining what kinds of incentives to be adopted in a contract. Traditional 
fixed-price contracts have been restricted to projects with few uncertainties on both 
technology and economics. In practice, owing to information asymmetries, even a “risk 
neutral” contractor may not be willing to sign a fixed-price contract without offering a high 
price. However, the high cost of identifying unforeseen events makes it difficult to draft a 
very elaborate contract to deal with all kinds of uncertainties at the post-contract award stage 
(Crocker and Reynolds, 1993). Cost-plus contracts may avoid the problem of overpayment, 
provided that it is well documented, but the client may expose himself to the problem of cost 
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padding (Badenfelt, 2010b). In order to reduce the negative effect of cost-plus contracts, it 
becomes a common practice to replace a standard cost-plus contract with a target cost 
contract which is believed to reinforce the deep collaboration between the client and 
contractor (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000).  
 
Agency theory suggested that outcome-based contracts can be effective in curbing agent 
opportunisms (Elsenhardt, 1989). In case of TCC (which can be considered to be an 
outcome-based contract), the contract can co-align the preference of the principal (the 
employer) and the agent (contractor), since the reward for both sides depends on the same 
actions, and reduces the conflict of self-interest between the employer and the contractor. It is 
further pointed out by Elsenhardt (1989) that information system can also curb opportunism 
since information systems inform the employer what the contractor is actually undertaking, 
the contractor will be less likely to deceive the employer. This may be one of the reasons why 
an open-book accounting arrangement is usually implemented together with TCC/GMP 
schemes. 
 
Previous research studies on TCC and GMP 
 
Nicolini et al. (2000) studied two successful pilot projects with TCC and commented that 
target costing may be one of the ways to support supply chain integration and improve 
profitability and quality of the construction industry within the United Kingdom. However, 
Rojas and Kell (2008) reported that the final construction cost of 75% of public school 
projects investigated in the northwest of the United States exceeded the contract GMP value, 
while the same phenomenon was observed on about 80% of public non-school projects. 
These findings did not support GMP to be really “guaranteed” as expected.  
 
Perry and Barnes (2000) proposed methods of tender evaluation of TCC and suggested that 
the contractor’s share of cost overrun and under spent should not be less than 50%. Broome 
and Perry (2002) and Badenfelt (2008) explored how the gain-share/pain-share ratio in TCC 
should be determined in the British and Swedish perspectives respectively.  
 
Boukendour and Bah (2001) analysed GMP with option pricing theory and considered GMP 
as a hybrid of cost reimbursement contract and optional contract which hedge the owner from 
over-budget and provide him possibility of cost savings. Bower et al. (2002) examined three 
projects with different contractual arrangements, including one with TCC, to illustrate the 
effective use of incentive mechanisms. They concluded that contractual incentive structures 
should provide appropriate incentives for contractors to meet the targets of cost, schedule and 
quality; correctly allocate risks and allow a suitable level of client’s involvement in the 
projects. 
 
Both Walker et al. (2002) and Hauck et al. (2004) investigated the case of the Australian 
National Museum procured with TCC arrangement. Bubshait (2003) conducted a 
questionnaire survey on incentive/disincentive contracting with the clients and contractors of 
industrial projects from Saudi Arabia, and his findings supported the use of this kind of 
contract. Tang et al. (2008) conducted a similar research on incentive contracts in Mainland 
China through an empirical survey and a case study of the Three Gorges Project.  
 
Facilities – Special Issue on Infrastructure Management 
(Final Accepted Manuscript), Volume 29, Issue 13/14, October 2011, Pages 542-562 
 
 5 
Pryke and Pearson (2006) launched case studies based in France and the United Kingdom to 
investigate the gain-share/pain-share arrangement implemented under a prime contracting 
procurement approach. Their study suggested that the use of GMP scheme has led to a 
change in attitude of contractors in handling variations occurring at the post-contract award 
stage which tended to increase the client’s final out-turn cost. The contractors became more 
proactive in financial control of inappropriate variations when a proper financial incentive is 
installed with the implementation of GMP contracts. Wong (2006) introduced a computerised 
system for cost management in a cable car project in Hong Kong to facilitate a more efficient 
management of documentation in TCC projects. Chan et al. (2007b) reported on the findings 
of 8 structured interviews in respect of motives, benefits, difficulties, risks and success 
factors of TCC/GMP contracts and suitability to adopt those procurement strategies.  
 
Furthermore, Chan et al. (2008) also evaluated the effectiveness of partnering on an 
underground railway extension project with TCC arrangement in Hong Kong via another 
study, recommending both partnering and TCC to be the essential ingredients of project 
success. Kaplanogu and Arditi (2009) explored the practice of pre-project peer reviews in 
construction companies of the United States, suggesting that this kind of review was critical 
in reducing the risk of a proposed new GMP project. 
 
Badenfelt (2010a) advocated a bundle of informal control mechanisms performed by project 
participants participating in a TCC project in Sweden. Another recent study by Badenfelt 
(2010b) reported on eight case studies of construction projects and IT projects in Sweden. It 
was found that social norms and work-related values and attitudes of key negotiators affect 
project outcomes considerably. Rose and Manley (2010) launched 4 case studies applying 
financial incentives (including TCC arrangement) in Australia and concluded that financial 
incentives could incorporate rewards across all key organisations contributing to team 
performance and a reward amount should be sufficient enough to be valued by potential 
receipts. They further perceived that the benefits derived from financial incentive 
mechanisms could be maximised with equitable risk allocation, early contractor’s 
involvement in design, value-driven tender selection, relationship workshop and future job 
opportunities. Chan et al. (2010a) reported on a case study of an underground railway station 
modification works procured with TCC in Hong Kong, which was completed ahead of 
schedule by 7 months and with a cost saving of 5%. Moreover, Chan et al. (2010b) sought 
some key risk factors and generated some effective risk mitigation measures for TCC/GMP 
contracts in construction based on a series of in-depth interviews with some senior industrial 
practitioners having abundant direct hands-on experience with TCC/GMP in Hong Kong. 
 
Despite an adequate amount of existing literature about the practices of TCC/GMP in 
overseas countries, empirical research studies on the “risk aspect” of these contractual 
arrangements are very limited especially in the Hong Kong context. There is a scarcity of 
published literature (as shown in Table 1) focusing on the risk allocation of TCC/GMP 
construction projects which are claimed to be applied to projects with high risks. This finding 
derived from previous literature review reinforces the objective of this paper by developing 
an optimal risk allocation scheme for TCC/GMP construction projects in Hong Kong and 
filling up the knowledge gap of risk management of the TCC/GMP procurement strategies. 
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Table 1. Some previous research studies on TCC/GMP between 2000 and 2010 
Authors Year Journal Country Focus 
Nicolini et al. 2000 BJM United Kingdom 
Two case studies of TCC in the United 
Kingdom 
Perry and Barnes 2000 ECAM United Kingdom 
Tender evaluation of TCC 
Boukendour and Bah 2001 CME United Kingdom 
Analysis of GMP with option pricing 
theory 
Bower et al. 2002 JME United States 
Comparison of incentive features of 3 
case studies 
Broome and Perry 2002 IJPM United Kingdom 
Determination of share ratios of TCC 
with utility theory 
Walker et al. 2002 SCMgt Australia 
Case study of the Australian National 
Museum Project procured with TCC 
arrangement 
Bubshait 2003 IJPM Saudi Arabia 
Perceptions of owners and contractors on 
incentive/disincentive contracting in 
industrial projects  
Hauck et al. 2004 JCEM Australia 
Case study of the Australian National 
Museum Project procured with TCC 
arrangement 
Pryke and Pearson 2006 BRI 
United 
Kingdom 
and France 
Case studies to investigate the gain-share 
/pain-share arrangement implemented 
under a prime contracting procurement 
approach 
Wong 2006 ITcon Hong Kong Study on a computer system for cost 
monitoring in cable car project with TCC  
Chan et al. 2007b JFMPC Hong Kong 
Report of interview findings on motives, 
benefits, difficulties, risks, success 
factors and suitability of adopting 
TCC/GMP  
Roja and Kell 2008 JCEM United States 
Comparison of cost growth performance 
between construction at risk with GMP 
and design-bid-build approach in school 
projects  
Chan et al. 2008 JME Hong Kong Case study of an underground railway 
extension project with TCC arrangement 
Tang et al. 2008 JCEM China 
Perceptions of stakeholders on incentives 
in the Chinese Mainland construction 
industry 
Badenfelt 2008 ECAM Sweden Derivation of share ratio in TCC  
Kaplanogu and Arditi 2009 ECAM United States 
Timing, benefits, effectiveness of 
pre-project peer reviews in GMP and 
lump sum contracts 
Badenfelt 2010a CME Sweden 
Informal and formal control mechanisms 
performed by project participants in a 
TCC project 
Badenfelt 2010b IJPM Sweden 
8 case studies of IT and construction 
projects to reveal strategies at macro and 
micro levels 
Rose and Manley 2010 ECAM Australia 4 case studies applying financial incentives (including TCC arrangement) 
Chan et al. 2010a Facilities Hong Kong 
Case study of a underground railway 
station modification and extension works 
project procured with TCC arrangement 
 
Notes: BJM: British Journal of Management; BRI: Building Research and Information; CME: Construction 
Management and Economics; ECAM: Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management; IJPM: 
International Journal of Project Management; JCEM: Journal of Construction Engineering and Management; 
JFMPC: Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction; JME: Journal of Management in 
Engineering; and SCMgt: Supply Chain Management: An International Journal. 
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Research methodology 
 
The research study reported herein was modified based on El-Sayegh (2008) which focused 
on risk assessment and risk allocation in the construction industry of the United Arab 
Emirates. In El-Sayegh (2008)’s study, the survey respondents were asked about the proper 
allocation of 42 identified risks. A similar approach was adopted in the present study and the 
target survey respondents were invited to determine the party (whether client or contractor) 
who is best capable to manage a particular risk associated with TCC/GMP contracts or 
equally shared between them, according to their lessons learned from previous TCC/GMP 
experience. A general principle is that each risk should be allocated to the party who is best 
capable to manage it at the least possible cost (Cooper et al., 2005). In other words, an 
optimal risk allocation is not to pass all risks to either party, but to seek a solution minimising 
both the total management costs of the client and contractor organisations (Ke et al., 2010). 
 
The empirical survey 
 
The identification of key risk factors in this study was launched through an extensive 
literature review, accompanied by a series of face-to-face interviews with a number of 
selected industrial practitioners possessing eminent hands-on TCC/GMP experience in Hong 
Kong between June and July of 2008 (Chan et al., 2010b), where risk factor was defined as 
“an event, activity or situation that could lead to the possibility of suffering some loss if 
happened” (Jha and Devaya, 2008). The interviews were found useful in acquiring a deep 
understanding of major TCC/GMP risk factors, as well as in facilitating the development and 
refinement of the empirical research questionnaire. A comprehensive list of 34 key risk 
factors inherent with TCC/GMP construction projects was then developed and distributed to 
four industrial experts with extensive hands-on TCC/GMP experience for review and 
validation as a pilot test. Ultimately, they were satisfied with these listed risk factors and no 
adverse comments were received from this pilot survey. 
 
An empirical survey form was then designed to solicit the perceptions of construction experts 
on the 34 identified risks encountered with TCC/GMP construction projects in Hong Kong. 
The survey form consisted of four parts. The first part was about the respondents’ personal 
profiles. The second part focused on the perceived level of severity to the project and 
likelihood of occurrence of the 34 listed risk factors in relation to TCC/GMP projects, and the 
respondents were also requested to choose the party best capable to manage each of the key 
risks identified (i.e. client, contractor or shared). The third part was concerned with the 
effectiveness of some recommended risk mitigation measures for TCC/GMP projects. The 
fourth part was optional and the respondents were welcome to express their personal 
preference on adopting TCC or GMP scheme in future together with their supporting reasons. 
However, only the major findings regarding the risk allocation of the 34 risk factors indicated 
in the second part on the survey questionnaire are reported and discussed in this paper due to 
length limitation.. In order to provide a more complete picture of the results of this survey, 
the assessment rankings of the 34 listed risk factors in descending order of their risk impact 
(i.e. severity multiplied by likelihood) are summarised in Table 2. Their detailed discussions 
and proper explanations can be referred to another journal article by Chan et al. (2011). The 
research results of other parts will be documented and disseminated through other 
publications in near future. 
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Table 2.  Impact of Risk Factors Encountered with TCC/GMP Schemes by all Survey 
Respondents (Chan et al., 2011) 
ID  Risk Factor Mean Rank 
5 Change in scope of work 16.41 1 
17 Insufficient design completion during tender invitation 15.46 2 
20 Unforeseeable design development risks at tender stage 14.54 3 
6 Errors and omissions in tender document 14.51 4 
21 Exchange rate variations 14.49 5 
29 Unforeseeable ground conditions 14.25 6 
1 Actual quantities of work required far exceeding estimate 13.97 7 
32 Lack of experience of contracting parties throughout TCC/GMP process 13.91 8 
22 Inflation beyond expectation 13.81 9 
3 Unrealistic maximum price or target cost agreed in the 
contract 13.76 10 
4 Disagreement over evaluating the revised contract price 
after submitting an alternative design by main contractor 13.51 11 
7 
Difficult for main contractor to have back-to-back 
TCC/GMP contract terms with nominated or domestic 
subcontractors 
13.31 12 
26 Global financial crisis 13.19 13 
18 Poor buildability / constructability of project design 13.11 14 
2 Delay in resolving contractual disputes 13.11 15 
9 Loss incurred by main contractor due to unclear scope of 
work 13.07 16 
16 Delay in work due to third party  12.64 17 
28 Inclement weather 12.43 18 
8 Inaccurate topographical data at tender stage 12.40 19 
19 Little involvement of main contractor in design development process 12.36 20 
15 Selection of subcontractors with unsatisfactory performance  12.17 21 
31 Difficult to obtain statutory approval for alternative cost 
saving designs 12.16 22 
33 Impact of construction project on surrounding environment  12.15 23 
12 Poor quality of work 12.07 24 
11 Technical complexity and design innovations requiring new 
construction methods and materials from main contractor 11.92 25 
23 Market risk due to the mismatch of prevailing demand of 
real estate 11.86 26 
24 Change in interest rate on main contractor’s working capital 11.33 27 
34 Environmental hazards of constructed facilities towards the 
community 11.17 28 
13 Delay in availability of labour, materials and equipment 11.03 29 
25 Delayed payment on contracts 10.81 30 
30 Change in relevant government regulations 10.80 31 
10 Difficult to agree on a sharing fraction of saving / overrun of budget at pre-contract award stage 10.72 32 
14 Low productivity of labour and equipment 10.09 33 
27 Force Majeure (Acts of God) 8.66 34 
 
Results and discussions 
 
A total of 300 self-administered blank survey forms were dispatched to target individual 
construction professionals and project stakeholders associated with the construction industry 
of Hong Kong, including those working for developers, consultant firms, main contractors, 
trade subcontractors, quasi-government organizations and relevant government works 
departments between March and April of 2009 by means of postal mail and electronic mail. 
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They were welcome to add any other new unmentioned risk factors on the survey form based 
on their personal discretion and actual experience, but no additional risk was finally 
suggested by them. The completed survey forms were collected through postal mails, 
electronic mails, fax and personal networking. One hundred and forty-one valid and duly 
completed forms were returned in June of 2009, generating a response rate of 47%. Among 
these 141 responses, 47 respondents declared that they had “No hands-on experience in 
procuring TCC/GMP construction projects” and they were advised not to complete the survey 
forms and returned the forms for record. The remaining 94 respondents either have acquired 
direct hands-on experience in TCC/GMP projects or they declared themselves having basic 
understanding about those TCC/GMP forms of procurement via conferences, seminars, 
workshops, journals and sharing from their counterparts even though without the direct 
exposure to TCC/GMP contracts before (Chan et al. (2011), so only the data and opinions 
obtained from these 94 responses were used for further data analysis. 
 
Such screening enabled the researchers to make sure that the respondents have gained 
fundamental understanding of TCC/GMP procurement approach in order to assure the value 
and creditability of survey results. Given the fact that there have been only 17 construction 
projects procured with TCC/GMP in Hong Kong so far up to 2007 (Chan et al., 2007b), the 
majority of related key project team members in adopting TCC/GMP had been included in 
the sample of this survey, their opinions and feedback could substantially represent the 
TCC/GMP project pool in Hong Kong over the past decade of 1999-2009. The chosen sample 
was thus considered to be representative, sufficient and reliable. 
 
Since the research study aims to seek the party best capable to manage each of the identified 
risks under TCC/GMP contracts according to the hands-on experience and perceptions of 
each individual, which should be independent of the roles involved in the projects (i.e. 
whether clients, contractors or consultants), their opinions should be lumped together for a 
holistic analysis. Therefore, the views of 94 respondents are presented on a collective basis in 
the paper, taking a similar approach by Ke et al. (2010) used in their work on risk allocation 
of PPP projects in Mainland China. Table 3 provides a summary of the personal profiles of 
survey respondents. More than 70% of the respondents have gained a wealth of working 
experience of more than 10 years. The respondents worked in different kinds of organisations, 
representing the views of clients, consultants and contractors. 
 
 
Table 3. Personal profiles of survey respondents 
Respondent Respondent Category Frequency Percentage Category Frequency Percentage 
Nature of organisation Number of TCC/GMP construction projects 
involved 
Client organisation 33 35.1 1-2 projects 34 36.2 
Main contractor 22 23.4 3-4 projects 12 12.8 
Architectural consultant 2 2.1 More than 4 projects 9 9.6 
Engineering consultant 3 3.2 39 41.5 
Quantity surveying 
consultant 19 20.2   
Project management 
Consultant 2 2.1   
Subcontractor 2 2.1   
Academic 9 9.6   
Others 2 2.1 
Have obtained basic 
understanding of the 
underlying principles 
of TCC/GMP 
schemes 
  
Total 94 100% Total 94 100% 
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Grouping by nature of organisation Experience level in construction industry 
Client group 33 35.1 Below 5 years 17 18.1 
Contractor group 27 28.7 5-10 years 11 11.7 
Consultant group 34 36.2 11-15 years 11 11.7 
   16-20 years 12 12.8 
   Over 20 years 43 45.7 
Total 94 100% Total 94 100% 
 
The survey respondents were requested to choose the “party best capable to manage the risk” 
corresponding to each of the listed risk factors, with the measurement scale shown below: 
 
Table 4. Meanings of choices on the survey form 
1 Client (100%) Client is best capable to manage the risk. 
2 Client > Contractor Client is more capable than Contractor to manage the risk. 
3 Client = Contractor  Both Client and Contractor are equally capable to manage the risk. 
4 Contractor > Client Contractor is more capable than Client to manage the risk. 
5 Contractor (100%) Contractor is best capable to manage the risk. 
 
Risk sharing in TCC may be referred to the establishment of sharing ratio between the 
employer and the contractor from some earlier research studies (Scherer, 1964; Cummins, 
1977). However, a multitude of previous studies in the field of construction management 
referred “risk allocation” as the perception of respondents on the expected/ideal allocation of 
individual risks. For example, Andi (2006) conducted a questionnaire survey to collect the 
opinions of industrial practitioners on expected and actual risk allocations in the Indonesian 
construction projects. Li et al. (2005) reported on the findings of a survey on perception on 
risk allocation of 46 risk factors in PPP/PFI projects in the United Kingdom. The “preferred” 
risk allocation was determined by the level of majority opinions. El-Sayegh (2008) also 
adopted this approach in his study about risk allocation in construction projects of the United 
Arab Emirates.  
 
The preferred risk allocation in this article is referred to the “perceived party best capable to 
manage the risk” which is for the party which has more than 50% of vote for such risk, 
applying the same principle from previous studies on risk allocation in construction by Li et 
al. (2005) and El-Sayegh (2008). With the principle that the party best capable to manage the 
risk should bear such risk, the interpretations of findings are illustrated as follows: 
 
Table 5. Interpretation of survey findings 
Case Result Perceived party best capable to 
manage the risk 
Case 1 Total percentage of Choice 1 plus Choice 2 > 50%  Client 
Case 2 Total percentage of Choice 4 plus Choice 5 > 50%  Contractor 
Case 3 Percentage of Choice 3 > 50%  Shared 
Case 4 None of Cases 1 to 3  Negotiated  
 
Agreement of respondents within experienced group and non-experienced group 
 
As observed in Table 3, some of the survey respondents (frequency = 39 out of a total of 94) 
did not have direct hands-on experience in TCC/GMP projects (but have obtained basic 
understanding of the underlying principles of TCC/GMP schemes) and they were classified 
as the non-experienced group. Experienced group were those who have participated in 
TCC/GMP projects before. A statistical test on the difference of opinions amongst the 
respondents within each of the two survey groups (i.e. within experienced group and within 
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non-experienced group) should be first conducted. As Ke et al. (2010) suggested, a Kendall’s 
concordance test is performed to gauge the agreement of different respondents on their 
preferences of risk allocation within a particular survey group. This statistical analysis aims 
to ascertain whether the respondents within an individual group respond in a consistent 
manner or not. 
 
However, the Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W) is only suitable when the number of 
attributes does not exceed 7 (Siegel and Castellan, 1988). Chi-square should be used as a near 
approximation instead if the number of attributes is greater than 7. The critical values of 
chi-square are referred to the table found in Siegel and Castellan (1988). The actual 
calculated chi-square values within the experienced group and non-experienced group are 
661.186 and 408.221 respectively, and they are both higher than 67.985 (i.e. the critical value 
of chi-square derived from the table with a degree of freedom of 33) at the 5% significance 
level. This statistical result implies that the assessment by various respondents on their risk 
allocation preferences within each of the two survey groups is found to be consistent and they 
are essentially applying the same standard in allocating the respective risk factors. 
 
Agreement of respondents between experienced group and non-experienced group 
 
Independent two-sample t-test was applied to test the agreement on the preference of 
allocation of each listed risk factor between the experienced group and non-experienced 
group as adopted by Ke et al. (2010). The result of the statistical test shown in Table 6 
indicated that there are no statistically significant differences on the preference of risk 
allocation in TCC/GMP projects between the experienced group and non-experienced group 
(all of the actual calculated significance levels larger than the critical value of 5%). It was 
concluded that the two sets of opinion data can be lumped together for further analysis and 
the survey findings are regarded as being consistent, reliable and representative. 
 
Risks to be allocated to client 
 
Eight risks to be allocated to client as depicted in Table 6 include: 
 Change in scope of work; 
 Errors and omissions in tender document; 
 Inaccurate topographical data at tender stage; 
 Insufficient design completion during tender invitation; 
 Poor buildability / constructability of project design; 
 Lack of involvement of main contractor in design development process; 
 Unforeseeable design development risks at tender stage; and 
 Consequence of delayed payment to contractor. 
 
After a careful observation, such eight risks may be classified into three groups, i.e. 
contractual risks, design risks, together with economic and financial risks.  
 
“Change in scope of work”, “Errors and omissions in tender document” and “Inaccurate 
topographical data at tender stage” could be considered as contractual risks encountered with 
TCC/GMP construction projects. “Change in scope of work” is regarded as a significant risk 
in TCC/GMP projects. According to a study by Cox et al. (1999) in the United Kingdom, it 
was revealed that change in employer’s requirements was one of the most frequently cited 
reasons for design changes in their cases explored. This risk was perceived as better taken by 
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client. The finding is consistent with another study on risk allocation by Ojo and Ogunsemi 
(2009) that the risk “change in work” was perceived to be allocated to client. Another two 
risks are both related to tender preparation. The respondents considered that the risks should 
be allocated to client. One of the possible reasons for this finding is that these three risks are 
under control on the client’s side. For example, most errors and omissions in tender 
documents are caused from the consultant’s side which represents the client’s interest. 
Similarly, inaccurate topographical data at tender stage is often provided by the client to 
contractor. The client has full control of this risk, although the client does not guarantee the 
accuracy of such data in most cases. According to Turner (2004), a contracting strategy 
should not only provide an incentive to deal with potential risks, but also should be flexible to 
accommodate contingencies such as late design changes and design variations. In most 
real-life cases of TCC/GMP, the contractor is entitled to have compensation for the 
occurrence of such risk factors (Fan and Greenwood, 2004; Chan et al., 2008). 
 
“Insufficient design completion during tender invitation”, “Poor buildability / constructability 
of project design”, “Little involvement of main contractor in design development process” 
and “Unforeseeable design development risks at tender stage” are all design risks and all of 
them are preferred to be taken by client. This finding is understandable and in line with those 
observations from previous research studies (e.g. Kartam and Kartam, 2001; Andi, 2006) as 
the entire design work is usually carried out by an independent team of design consultants 
(e.g. architects, structural engineers, building services engineers, etc) due to their inherent 
expertise and professional training, who represent the clients’ intent and interests, while the 
contractor is passive in design changes under the traditional construction practices in Hong 
Kong. The clients would be in a more advantageous position to manage these design risks.  
 
The last risk which should be allocated to client was “Consequence of delayed payment to 
contractor”. Again, the finding echoes the previous study on risk allocation in the 
construction industry (Andi, 2006) and standard form of contracts such as the NEC3 Option 
C stating that interest is paid on late payment if a certified payment is late or a payment is late 
because the Project Manager does not issue a certificate which he should issue.  
 
By observation, it is not difficult to see that there is a common point on the risks perceived to 
be better allocated to client – they are all under the control of client (e.g. change in scope of 
works, errors and omissions in tender document, delayed payment on contracts and the like.) 
The findings appear to match with the fault standard and management standard as suggested 
by Grove (2000). According to the fault standard, the time and cost impacts of those risks 
caused through the faults of a party should be borne by that party. Obviously, the faults of 
client cause those risks mentioned above, and thus the survey result matches the fault 
standard. On the other hand, the philosophy of the management standard states that a risk 
should belong to the party who is best able to evaluate and control it (Grove, 2000). The 
client can exercise full control of all of the risks mentioned in this part (e.g. insufficient 
design completion during tender invitation, change in scope of work, etc). The survey result 
is therefore considered to be reasonable and reflective of the real-life situations. 
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Table 6.  Preferred allocation of risk factors in TCC/GMP construction projects in Hong 
Kong 
Risk allocation Independent   2-sample t-test Risk factor 
Client Shared Contractor Allocated to t-value Sig. level 
5 Change in scope of work 80.9% 13.8% 5.3% Client .356 .723 
6 Errors and omissions in tender document 64.5% 15.1% 20.4% Client -1.721 .089 
8 Inaccurate topographical data at tender stage 61.3% 22.6% 16.1% Client -.750 .455 
17 Insufficient design completion during tender invitation 79.6% 16.1% 4.3% Client .041 .967 
18 Poor buildability / constructability of project design 50.5% 22.6% 26.9% Client .570 .570 
19 Lack of involvement of main contractor in design development process 68.8% 12.9% 18.3% Client -.250 .803 
20 Unforeseeable design development risks at tender stage 65.6% 24.7% 9.7% Client .612 .542 
25 Consequence of delayed payment to contractor 73.4% 18.1% 8.5% Client .925 .359 
7 Difficult for main contractor to have back-to-back TCC/GMP 
contract terms with nominated or domestic subcontractors 8.7% 13.0% 78.3% Contractor 1.335 .185 
12 Poor quality of work 6.5% 17.2% 76.3% Contractor .916 .364 
13 Delay in availability of labour, materials and equipment 2.1% 17.0% 80.9% Contractor .719 .474 
14 Low productivity of labour and equipment 1.1% 10.6% 88.3% Contractor .175 .862 
15 Selection of subcontractors with unsatisfactory performance  4.3% 23.4% 72.3% Contractor -1.239 .218 
24 Change in interest rate on main contractor’s working capital 5.4% 24.7% 69.9% Contractor -.015 .988 
2 Delay in resolving contractual disputes 25.8% 64.5% 9.7% Shared -1.251 .214 
4 Disagreement over evaluating the revised contract price after 
submitting an alternative design by main contractor 26.9% 57.0% 16.1% Shared -.058 .954 
10 Difficult to agree on a sharing fraction of saving / overrun of budget 
at pre-contract award stage 16.1% 77.4% 6.5% Shared -.756 .451 
22 Inflation beyond expectation 19.1% 51.1% 30.9% Shared -1.332 .186 
26 Global financial crisis  11.8% 83.9% 4.3% Shared -1.977 .051 
27 Force Majeure (Acts of God) 10.8% 78.5% 10.7% Shared -.027 .979 
28 Inclement weather 7.5% 57.0% 35.5% Shared .534 .594 
30 Change in relevant government regulations 35.5% 60.2% 4.3% Shared -1.787 .077 
32 Lack of experience of contracting parties throughout TCC/GMP process 20.4% 59.1% 20.5% Shared 1.276 .205 
1 Actual quantities of work required far exceeding estimate 41.3% 32.6% 26.1% Negotiated .029 .977 
3 Unrealistic maximum price or target cost agreed in the contract 38.3% 41.5% 20.2% Negotiated 1.482 .142 
9 Loss incurred by main contractor due to unclear scope of work 45.2% 29.0% 25.8% Negotiated -.218 .828 
11 Technical complexity and design innovations requiring new 
construction methods and materials from main contractor 12.8% 41.5% 45.7% Negotiated .466 .643 
16 Delay in work due to third party  23.4% 44.7% 31.9% Negotiated -1.879 .063 
21 Exchange rate variations 18.1% 42.6% 39.3% Negotiated -1.320 .190 
23 Market risk due to the mismatch of prevailing demand of real estate 45.7% 41.5% 12.8% Negotiated -1.209 .230 
29 Unforeseeable ground conditions 32.6% 42.4% 25.0% Negotiated -1.177 .242 
31 Difficult to obtain statutory approval for alternative cost saving designs 29.8% 37.2% 33.0% Negotiated .081 .936 
33 Impact of construction project on surrounding environment 17.2% 44.1% 38.7% Negotiated 1.496 .138 
34 Environmental hazards of constructed facilities towards the 
community 24.5% 44.7% 30.8% Negotiated 1.386 .169 
 
Risks to be allocated to contractor 
 
As revealed from Table 6, six risks were discerned to be better managed by contractor, 
namely: 
 Difficult for main contractor to have back-to-back TCC/GMP contract terms with 
nominated or domestic subcontractors; 
 Responsibility for quality; 
 Delay in availability of labour, materials and equipment; 
 Low productivity of labour and equipment; 
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 Selection of subcontractors with unsatisfactory performance; and 
 Change in interest rate on main contractor’s working capital. 
 
Four of these six risks to be better allocated to contractor (i.e. “Responsibility for quality”, 
“Delay in availability of labour, materials and equipment”, “Low productivity of labour and 
equipment”, and “Selection of subcontractors with unsatisfactory performance”) are related 
to site operation. More than 70% of the respondents believed that these four risks should lie 
on contractor in TCC/GMP projects as observed from Table 5. 
 
This finding is rational since contractors are the actual constructors by nature, they would be 
better positioned to manage the construction risks encountered during site operation. Based 
on the results obtained from their fuzzy risk allocation model by Lam et al. (2007), the risk of 
subcontractor failure in controlling the quality of work should be allocated to contractor. 
Another study by Andi (2006), suggesting that poor quality of work, delay in availability of 
labour, materials and equipment and selection of subcontractors with unsatisfactory 
performance should be allocated to contractor, supports the current findings reported in this 
paper.  
 
More than 75% of the respondents perceived that “Difficult for main contractor to have 
back-to-back TCC/GMP contract terms with nominated or domestic subcontractors” was 
better managed by contractor. About 70% of the respondents considered “Change in interest 
rate on main contractor’s working capital” should be allocated to contractor. These findings 
are congruent again with the management standard of risk allocation suggested by Grove 
(2000). The main contractor is the sole party who can exercise control over the contractual 
issues with the subcontractors. Regarding the change in interest rate on main contractor’s 
working capital, the contractor is the party whom the loss suffers from in the first instance if 
the risk does materialise. This falls on one of the Abrahamson’s principles which are a classic 
risk allocation principle (Abrahamson, 1984). One may concern about the risk of termination 
of contract due to client’s bankruptcy. In Hong Kong, the clients applying the TCC/GMP 
procurement strategies are the relevant works departments of the HKSAR Government, 
quasi-government organisations, leading private property developers and large-scale major 
construction contractors (Chan et al., 2010b). Bankruptcy of clients may not be a significant 
risk. However, the situation may not be the same in other parts of the world. In case of 
client’s bankruptcy, obviously, the contractor has to take this risk. In most construction 
contracts in Hong Kong, there are proper contractual mechanisms in place to deal with this 
risk. The payment owed to the contractor by the client may be regarded as a debt in this case.  
 
Risks to be shared between client and contractor 
 
Nine risks were perceived to be better shared between client and contractor. Through a closer 
examination, these nine risks may be sub-divided into two types: (1) risks out of control of 
both parties; and (2) risks which both parties have potential to generate. Risks out of control 
of both parties cover: 
 Inflation beyond expectation; 
 Global financial crisis; 
 Force Majeure (Act of God) 
 Inclement weather; and 
 Change in relevant government regulations. 
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When compared with the risk/obligation allocation model mentioned in the “No Dispute 
Report” (National Building and Construction Council, 1989) published in Australia, the 
findings for “Inflation beyond expectation”, Force Majeure (Act of God)”, “Inclement 
weather” and “Change in relevant government regulations” match well with the model, 
indicating that the findings are sensible and logical in general. The fuzzy risk allocation 
model proposed by Lam et al. (2007) suggested that risks on inflation and inclement weather 
should be shared between client and contractor as well. In practice, inclement weather is a 
ground of granting extension of time in most construction contracts in Hong Kong, while the 
contractors have to predict any cost implications for such risk. Inflation risk is shared when 
fluctuation clause is applied in the TCC/GMP projects. Perhaps, the rationale behind such 
contractual clause is that both parties cannot control the level of severity and likelihood of 
occurrence of such risks. As it is unfair to ask either party to take these risks, they ought to be 
shared between the two parties under the contract. 
 
“Delay in resolving contractual disputes”, “Disagreement over evaluating the revised contract 
price after submitting an alternative design by main contractor”, and “Lack of experience of 
contracting parties throughout TCC/GMP process” were risks which both client and 
contractor have contribution to their occurrence. For example, “delay in resolving contractual 
disputes”, the delay can be caused by both parties in the process of preparation of claims 
and/or assessment of claims. This risk was perceived as a shared risk in the study of Andi 
(2008). 
 
Regarding the risk factor “Difficult to agree on a sharing fraction of saving / overrun of 
budget at pre-contract award stage”, the issues on the sharing fraction are subject to 
negotiation between the two parties in case of negotiated tendering employed in the 
TCC/GMP projects. Chan et al. (2007b) opined that inexperienced clients and contractors 
may jeopardise the TCC/GMP process. This risk appears to be inevitable in Hong Kong, 
since the number of TCC/GMP projects completed is rather scarce in the local construction 
market. The risk is discerned to be shared possibly due to the fact that the client can make a 
decision on whether to apply the TCC/GMP procurement strategies in a certain new project 
or the contractor can decide on whether to bid for those projects procured with TCC/GMP 
contractual arrangements. 
 
Conclusions 
 
An in-depth understanding of the significant risks is an imperative in project delivery with 
TCC/GMP contractual arrangements. Inadequate consideration of risk allocation may result 
in failure in achieving the stated project objectives upon completion. Literature review 
indicated that previous research studies on the risk management of TCC/GMP scheme are 
rather limited. This paper has attempted to fill up the knowledge gap of risk management in 
TCC/GMP construction projects. This study adopted an empirical questionnaire survey to 
examine the preferred risk allocation of TCC/GMP projects, concluding that the risks under 
client’s control such as risks on tender documentation and project design are suggested to be 
borne by client and construction risks are perceived to be taken by contractor. Such findings 
are in line with previous similar research studies on risk allocation in construction projects in 
general and are consistent with the management standard and fault standard of risk allocation 
as advocated in the Grove (2000)’s report in particular. 
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The survey findings could serve as a useful reference for desirable risk allocation for future 
TCC/GMP contracts in construction. Given the fact that TCC/GMP schemes are extensively 
applied in infrastructure projects worldwide including Hong Kong (Walker et al, 2002; Rojas 
and Kell, 2008; Chan et al., 2008; Bogus et al., 2010; Chan et al., 2010a), the findings of this 
study should be relevant and essential to both construction academics and industrial 
practitioners in the field of infrastructure development and management. The research study 
has engendered some research evidence to capture the lessons learned from previous 
TCC/GMP construction projects for generating best practice guidelines for equitable 
(preferred) risk allocation in future target cost-based projects especially in those infrastructure 
developments often associated with high risks, both locally and overseas. 
 
Further qualitative investigations such as face-to-face interviews and in-depth case studies of 
various TCC/GMP projects may be undertaken in future to verify the suitability of preferred 
risk allocation in reality and to substantiate the propositions derived from the current study, 
together with the possible reasons behind these allocation preferences. Moreover, the same 
research methodology and questionnaire survey may be launched in some western countries 
like the United Kingdom, United States and Australia to glean opinions of relevant project 
stakeholders for international comparisons between the East and the West in respect of their 
similarities and differences. Limitations of the research study lie in the conclusions drawn 
being indicative rather than conclusive, as merely 94 completed survey questionnaires were 
received and analysed owing to a limited number of TCC/GMP construction projects in Hong 
Kong. Notwithstanding, the survey findings would be valuable for future studies in this area. 
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